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Abstract—Mobile Shopping Applications (MSAs) are rapidly
gaining popularity. They enhance the shopping experience,
for instance by offering customized recommendations or in-
corporating customer loyalty programs. Although MSAs are
quite effective at attracting new customers and binding existing
ones to a retailer’s services, existing MSAs have several
shortcomings. The data collection practices involved in MSAs
and the lack of transparency thereof are important concerns
for many, increasingly privacy-aware, (potential) customers.
This paper presents inShopnito, a privacy-preserving mobile
shopping application. All transactions made in inShopnito are
unlinkable and anonymous. However, the system still offers all
features expected from a modern MSA. Customers can take
part in loyalty programs and earn or spend loyalty points
and electronic vouchers. Furthermore, the MSA can suggest
personalized recommendations even though the retailer cannot
construct rich customer profiles. These profiles are managed on
the smartphone and can be partially disclosed in order to get
better, customized recommendations. Finally, we present an
implementation of inShopnito, the security and performance
of which is analyzed. In doing so, we show that inShopnito
combines multiple advanced technologies into a secure, privacy-
preserving and practical mobile shopping application.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, mobile shopping applications (MSAs)
have made a significant rise in popularity. MSAs are (usu-
ally smartphone-based) applications that provide customers
with an enhanced shopping experience. They are cheap to
deploy, as most people carry smartphones and are already
familiar with mobile applications. One important feature
of an MSA is to facilitate the participation in Customer
Loyalty Programs (CLPs) [1]–[4]. Customers enrolled in
a CLP receive different incentives (e.g., loyalty points,
discount vouchers, gifts, etc.) on each transaction with the
retailer. They can collect loyalty points that can later be
exchanged for discounts or promotional items. CLPs allow
providers not only to encourage loyal behaviour but also to
collect and analyze data about customers (e.g., brand pref-
erences, average spending, etc.). This information is useful
to retailers for planning better marketing and advertising
strategies. In addition, MSAs can provide more advanced
services. For instance, Belgacom and BNP Paribas Fortis
recently announced the Belgian Mobile Wallet [5], a mobile
application that, in addition to loyalty cards, will support
mobile identity management and payments. Furthermore,
MSAs can enhance the shopping experience by providing
relevant recommendations to its users.
Unfortunately, existing MSAs have major shortcomings
that hinder their complete adoption. Current data collec-
tion practices raise privacy concerns among customers. For
instance, a recent survey [6] shows that nearly 30% of
the participants think that CLPs require too much personal
information and 24% indicated that privacy concerns are
the reason why they do not enroll in such programs.
These privacy concerns have given CLPs a negative rep-
utation [7]–[9]. In addition, this problem is even worse
for the smartphone-based MSAs because they can use the
customer’s smartphone to gather additional information, like
the current geolocation or the customer’s actual identity.
Finally, although the collected information allows retailers
to send customized and more accurate recommendations to
the MSA, it is unclear what data exactly is collected by the
MSA, and what retailers actually do with the data (e.g., sell
it to a third party).
In this paper we present inShopnito, a privacy-friendly
mobile shopping application. inShopnito incorporates a se-
ries of security- and privacy-enhancing technologies into
a full-fledged MSA. Retailers can reward customers with
anonymous and unlinkable loyalty points and electronic
vouchers. In addition, transactional data is securely stored
and managed on the smartphone itself, resulting in local
profiles controlled by customers. Users can opt-in to disclose
parts of their (anonymized) profile in order to get cus-
tomized recommendations from a recommendation system,
without sacrificing their privacy. Furthermore, the integrity
of the revealed information is protected by inShopnito and,
therefore, the data collected by providers is not only less
sensitive, but also more accurate. In addition, inShopnito
could be used to combine CLPs from multiple providers,
thus, facilitating cooperation. Finally, the system facilitates
retailers to comply with privacy laws because the data that
is being stored is less sensitive.
In short, this paper makes the following key contributions:
• Design of a privacy-protecting and practical mo-
bile shopping application We present inShopnito, a
privacy-protecting MSA which offers many of the same
benefits for customers as well as retailers compared
to the traditional approach. Although a retailer cannot
monetize the collected data by reselling it, privacy-
concerned customers will be more inclined to use the
service and, hence, the services of the retailer.
• Implementation and evaluation of our proposed
solution We implemented the inShopnito system and
created an Android application to demonstrate its fea-
sibility. The performance results of the main user-
actions (e.g., authentication, checkout, application start-
up time) show that the system is practical to use.
II. RELATED WORK
Even though privacy is recognized as an important issue in
the loyalty schemes [10], [11], there is not a significant body
of research addressing this issue. The existing proposals for
privacy in the loyalty schemes usually focus on unlinkability
of the loyalty points issued to the user. For instance, in the
proposal by Enzmann and Schneider [12], blind signatures
are utilized to avoid linking loyalty points in the issuing
and the spending interaction with the provider. However,
their proposed solution cannot securely prevent the users
from sharing their loyalty points. On the other hand, in
[13] the authors suggest that users anonymously download
a loyalty card from a large pool to assure their privacy.
Although the users remain anonymous towards the provider,
their loyalty cannot be measured. A common issue for these
two approaches is that the retailer cannot record any data,
even with user consent. The shopping data that is collected
through the loyalty system is also employed for determining
the interests and for offering relevant products to the user.
Work by Hardt and Nath [14] allows users to choose the
amount of personal information that is to be disclosed to an
ad server in order to be offered personalized ads. The user
sends (a part of) personal preferences to the ad server, which
are used for coarse-grained filtering of ads that are sent to
user’s device. The user application then performs the final
filtering of the received ads based on the stored details on the
user preferences. Similarly, we allow the user to be presented
with recommendations based on the current shopping cart
contents. In this work, we also enable the user to collect
loyalty points and subsequently prove ownership of them
without the two interactions being linkable. The practicality
of this proposal is improved compared to existing solutions,
as it allows users to utilise one application to manage all
aspects of the shopping interactions.
III. INSHOPNITO
inShopnito is an MSA that allows customers and retailers
to take advantage of mobile platforms without sacrificing
customer’s privacy. To achieve this goal, inShopnito re-
lies on the following main components (Figure 1): anony-
mous credential management, privacy-preserving loyalty and
voucher schemes, privacy-preserving recommendations and
a secure storage mechanism. Thanks to these mechanisms,
inShopnito supports shopping sessions (i.e., purchases, loy-
alty point and voucher operations) that are anonymous and
unlinkable by default; thus, reducing the privacy concerns
associated with the data collected by retailers. With in-
Shopnito, customers have better control over their personal
data, as identifiable session information is securely stored
on their smartphones1 (instead of the retailer’s database).
Still, customers can optionally disclose additional infor-
mation from their local profiles to receive more accurate
recommendations and personalized services. Furthermore,
inShopnito also provides several benefits to retailers such
as support for advanced functionality (e.g., context-based
recommendations and family loyalty schemes), improved
control and security over loyalty and voucher operations and
better integrity guarantees for the anonymous data collected.
A. Threat model
inShopnito’s design considers different adversaries. First,
malicious customers that try to abuse or misuse the appli-
cation for their benefit. For this purpose, they may attempt
to forge, modify, steal or illegally share credentials, loyalty
points or vouchers. In addition, they may also try to double-
spend loyalty points or vouchers. Second, a malicious re-
tailer that tries to break the privacy guarantees offered
by inShopnito. For example, a curious but honest retailer
may try to discover users’ identities by analyzing the data
collected during an inShopnito session or by linking different
transactions using data mining techniques. However, the
retailer follows the protocols set by inShopnito. Third, an
external adversary that tries to break the security and privacy
guarantees offered by inShopnito via passive attacks (e.g.,
eavesdropping communications), active attacks (e.g., man-
in-the-middle attacks) or by getting access to a customer’s
smartphone.
Furthermore, we assume that the system has been properly
initialized and that no linkable or identifiable information
is leaked by other operations (e.g., payments) or protocols
(e.g., data link or network information).
B. General Description
In this section we describe how the inShopnito app is used
by customers during a visit to a retailer’s store (e.g., grocery
1Secure cloud storage support will be added in the near future.
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Figure 1. inShopnito’s mobile and server components
shop). In particular, we focus on the security and privacy
mechanisms used on each step of the shopping session.
Registration: To use the inShopnito app, customers first
need to register and obtain an inShopnito credential. In our
design, the inShopnito credential is an Idemix credential [15]
(i.e., anonymous credential) with the minimal attributes
required by the retailer. To create their accounts and obtain
their credentials, customers can reveal personally identifiable
information (e.g., name, address, gender, etc.). inShopnito
guarantees that customers’ transactions will not be asso-
ciated with their accounts. The retailer itself or a trusted
third-party can act as registration authority. In addition,
customers could register remotely over the Internet using the
inShopnito app or in person. Furthermore, the phone’s secure
element is initialized with applets for the secure storage
and voucher component2. After a successful registration, a
customer is issued an inShopnito credential. The credential
and its secret are securely stored in the customer’s smart-
phone using inShopnito’s secure storage component (Section
IV-E). Moreover, credentials can include an expiration date,
after which customers will need to renew them.
Starting the app: To start the inShopnito app, cus-
tomers need to authenticate first. For this purpose, the app
prompts customers for a PIN or password (previously set
up during app installation) that is used to decrypt and load
data from the secure storage (i.e., credential and its secret,
loyalty points, vouchers and local profile information). After
successful authentication, customers can access all the app
information. For instance, loyalty point and voucher balance,
previous transactions and information revealed to the retailer
can be inspected.
Connecting to the inShopnito server: To start a shop-
ping session, customers need to connect to the retailer’s
2As inShopnito aims to be practical, it can also function without secure
elements. This, however, disables the voucher component and weakens
security guarantees.
inShopnito server. In our design, we assume that the retailer
provides a Wi-Fi network in its facilities to access the server
(remote access over a cellular data networks is possible
too). The inShopnito app includes a list of the retailer’s
Wi-Fi access points and servers as well as their corre-
sponding SSL/TLS certificates. Using this information, the
inShopnito app automatically connects and authenticates the
Wi-Fi access point. Next, the inShopnito app establishes a
secure SSL/TLS connection and authenticates the inShopnito
server.
Starting an anonymous shopping session: After con-
necting to the server, the inShopnito client sends a request
for a new session to the server. In response, the server
sends back its authentication policy and a random nonce.
The authentication policy indicates the required and optional
attributes the customer should satisfy to start a new session
(i.e., customer authentication). For example, the authentica-
tion policy may require the customer to prove she owns a
valid credential and she is an adult and optionally to reveal
her shopping preferences and zip code. If the customer ac-
cepts the policy, then the inShopnito’s credential component
(Section IV-A) generates an Idemix zero-knowledge proof
that satisfies the policy and sends it to the server. Optionally,
the app can remember the customer’s acceptance of the
current authentication policy. In this way, the customer will
only be asked again in the future if the policy changes. If
the proof is correctly validated by the server’s credential
component, then a new shopping cart and a unique session
ID are created for the customer. In addition, a copy of the
shopping cart is also created in the mobile app. The shopping
cart contains the information revealed by the customer in the
authentication proof. Still, in most cases this information is
not enough to reveal the customer’s identity; thus, the session
created is anonymous.
Shopping and recommendations: Based on informa-
tion revealed in the previous step, the customer receives
recommendations and discount coupons from the server
(Section IV-D). For instance, if the customer only revealed
the minimal information required, then she will only receive
generic recommendations and coupons. The customer can
now proceed to scan items with her smartphone and add
them to the inShopnito shopping cart. At any moment before
checkout, the customer can add or delete items or modify the
amount of a particular item. In addition, the customer can
access information about the item (e.g., description, reviews)
and about the total amount due. Every time the shopping
cart is modified in the mobile app, the server’s shopping
cart is also updated. Moreover, the server’s recommendation
component periodically reviews the customer’s shopping cart
and sends new recommendations and coupons based on the
current items in the shopping cart.
Checkout: Before checking out, the customer decides
if she wants to redeem loyalty points and vouchers for
discounts or other benefits. For example, in our scenario,
Figure 2. inShopnito’s checkout screen. The customer uses one voucher
and 250 loyalty points worth e1 and e2.5 respectively.
loyalty points and vouchers are used to provide a direct
discount from the total amount due by the customer (1
loyalty point = 1 cent). The loyalty point (Section IV-B) and
voucher (Section IV-C) components allow the customer to
redeem loyalty points and vouchers in a privacy-preserving
way. The customer can select the amount of loyalty points
and vouchers to use and review the total discount achieved
(Figure III-B). Subsequently, during checkout, the loyalty
points and voucher components generate the proofs required
to redeem the selected loyalty points and voucher. In addi-
tion, if the transaction earns the customer new loyalty points,
then the server will send them to the mobile app. Next,
a payment operation is executed, which is assumed to be
privacy-friendly (e.g., cash or privacy-friendly credit card).
Finally, the transaction details are added to local profile
component of the inShopnito app.
IV. INSHOPNITO COMPONENTS
In this section, we present more details of inShopnito’s
main components (Figure 1).
A. Credentials
The credential component manages the operations as-
sociated with inShopnito’s credentials in the mobile app
and the server. As previously stated, inShopnito’s design
relies on Idemix credentials [15]; however, support for other
anonymous credentials systems is also possible. In the mo-
bile app, the credential component takes care of processing
the server authentication policy, creating the corresponding
authentication proofs, generating commitments to attributes
in the credential and requesting new or updating existent
credentials. At the server side, the credential component
deals with issuing or updating credentials and validating
authentication proofs. Moreover, we use our own develop-
ment framework [16] to facilitate the integration of Idemix
credentials and support future credentials technologies.
B. Loyalty Points
The main goals of the loyalty points component is to
allow customers to earn and redeem loyalty points in a
privacy-preserving way and to give retailers better control
over and security of loyalty point operations. For this
purpose, we rely on our own anonymous and unlinkable
incentives scheme [17]. By default, inShopnito’s loyalty
points cannot be associated with a particular transaction
or customer identity. Hence, customer privacy is achieved
by guaranteeing anonymity and unlinkability while earning
and redeeming loyalty points. Still, customers can prove
anonymously (via zero-knowledge proofs) that a particular
loyalty point is linked to their inShopnito credentials (i.e.,
the loyalty point was issued to them). This approach allows
the retailer to prevent illegal sharing of loyalty points and
makes theft more difficult. In addition, the retailer keeps a
log of redeemed loyalty points to detect and prevent double-
spending. These properties are achieved by using different
cryptographic building blocks such as anonymous creden-
tials (i.e., Idemix [15]), zero-knowledge proofs [18], com-
mitment schemes [19] and partially blind signatures [20].
Despite of the heavy cryptographic operations and the use
of a mobile platform, our experimental results (Section
V) show that our design and implementation are efficient
enough for our shopping scenario.
To earn loyalty points, the customer needs to complete
a transaction with the retailer. After an interactive protocol,
the customer receives a loyalty point that consists of the
following values:
LoyaltyPoint = [V, I, Sig(V, I, comm(LS))]
where V is the value of the loyalty point, I is public
information that define rules on how the loyalty point should
be used (e.g., expiration), comm(LS) is a commitment to
a secret value in the customer credential (loyalty secret)
and Sig() is a partially blind signature on the previous
values generated by the retailer. To ensure a sufficient
level of anonymity, the set of possible values and public
information combinations should be general and determined
in advance (i.e., fixed values). To redeem, the customer
sends her loyalty points to the retailer together with a zero-
knowledge proof that shows that the customer owns a valid
inShopnito credential and that its loyalty secret corresponds
with the commitment in the loyalty points to be redeemed.
In addition, the retailer verifies that the loyalty points have
not expired, the commitment has not been used before and
that the blind signature is correct. For more details about our
unlinkable incentives scheme, please refer to our technical
report [17].
C. Anonymous Offline Vouchers
Vouchers represent an amount of money issued to cus-
tomers by the retailer itself (e.g., a refund) or by other
parties (e.g., a job benefit). They can also include rules
on how they may be spent. The inShopnito voucher com-
ponent allows customers to receive and spend vouchers
with better privacy and security guarantees. In addition,
retailers and voucher issuers also benefit from increased
control and security. Similarly to loyalty points, our voucher
scheme achieves privacy by making voucher issuing and
spending operations unlinkable (however, only spending is
anonymous). While loyalty points rely on an online system
for redeeming and for double-spending prevention, vouchers
use an offline approach based on a tamper-resistant secure
element (SE) [21]. The voucher component assumes that no
data can be extracted from the SE and that the SE executes
all tasks as specified in the Voucher Applet (i.e., that it is
trustworthy). This ensures that no voucher will ever “exist
twice”. Vouchers are deleted the moment they are transferred
to another SE. As a result, double-spending is prevented. It
is clear that this property is broken if a voucher ever leaves
the secure environment of the SE in an unencrypted form.
The issuing service has two key pairs: one that it uses
to sign vouchers and a second one to prove its identity.
Upon registration to the service, each customer or retailer
obtains an SE, which has the voucher applet pre-installed.
The SE also contains a unique private key and corresponding
certificate signed by the issuing service. This private key,
generated on the SE, is not known to anybody. The SE uses
this key pair to prove that it is indeed certified and that the
customer has registered for the service. Furthermore, the SE
also contains copies of the two public keys of the issuing
service.
A voucher issued to a customer contains the following
information:
Voucher = [V,E, n,SigI(H(V,E,P), n)]
where V corresponds to the monetary value of the voucher,
E is the expiration date, P define a set of properties (e.g.,
transferable or not transferable to other customers), n is a
random serial number, H() is a cryptographic hash function
and SigI is a signature on by the issuer. The signature
is a partially blinded signature, i.e., the issuer and the
customer know the first argument (P), but the issuer has
no information on the second argument (n).
The issuing protocol consists of two parts. First we have
a mutual authentication stage in which both parties prove
their identities. This authentication phase results in a fresh,
random shared session key. Once the identities have been
verified and the shared key has been established, one or
more vouchers can be created for this customer. In this case
the recipient proves with a key pair registered to the system
that it is an SE. The session key is used to set up a secure
and authentic channel between the SE and the issuer. This
channel is used for the exchange of all messages of the
second stage.
For the second stage, we use the partially blinded sig-
nature scheme described in [20]. We are using the scheme
unaltered with the following conventions: info = V,E,P and
msg = n ∈R Z. The random number n is generated inside
the SE and serves as a unique serial number for the voucher.
It is blinded during the signing phase; the issuing service
does not know this serial number. The shared parameter
info is known to both the customer and the issuing service.
In order to ensure sufficient anonymity, the set of possible
info values should be limited compared to the number of
vouchers. After this second stage, the SE of the customer
contains a fresh Voucher. This stage is repeated if more than
one voucher is issued.
To transfer one or more vouchers to either another cus-
tomer or a retailer, we only need to transfer a Voucher and
the corresponding signature to the other party. It is essential
during transfer that the receiving party proves that it is in
fact a registered SE (to prevent leaking of vouchers outside
the system). For privacy, it is essential that the “paying”
party does not reveal its identity. Again, first a secure
channel is established between the two parties (with the
recipient proving its identity). During transfer, the voucher
and its signature are encrypted and authenticated using the
established session key, preventing an eavesdropper from
duplicating it.
D. Local Profile and Recommendation System
A privacy-friendly recommendation system can enhance
customer’s shopping experience without sacrificing privacy.
Many popular recommendation techniques base their sug-
gestions on the behaviour data of all users. inShopnito
applies algorithms that can give relevant recommendations
to customers using just their own data [22]. The customers
manage local profiles on their own device, instead of the
retailer gathering vast amounts of data on all customers.
A new shopping basket is created on the server when
customers have anonymously authenticated, after which
products can be added to this basket. The server includes a
recommendation system and a product database containing
metadata (e.g., category information, ingredients, etc.) for
every item that the store has for sale. The recommendation
system suggests products or discount vouchers which have
similar metadata as the products that are already in the bas-
ket. As more products are added to the basket, the customer’s
profile will become more refined and the recommendations
are likely to become more accurate.
With inShopnito, the server is unable to link new shopping
sessions to any one particular customer. It is not possible
to tie any personal information such as age or gender to
a certain shopping session, and there is no knowledge of
past shopping behavior. Historic consumption behavior is
highly useful for recommendation systems, hence the recom-
mendations will initially be of poor quality. This is known
as the cold start problem [23]. inShopnito therefore offers
the customer incentives to voluntarily disclose personal or
historical information. Customers can choose to reveal more
information than necessary during authentication by reveal-
ing additional credential attributes. In addition, inShopnito
keeps the customer’s shopping history in a local profile on
the smartphone itself. This historical information is used
to compile a preference profile, which assigns customer
preferences to categories. These preferences can be used by
the retailer to suggest relevant recommendations.
E. Secure storage
inShopnito’s loyalty points and vouchers are an interesting
target for attackers. Therefor, inShopnito uses a secure
storage component to store the cryptographic keys that are
used to decrypt the inShopnito credential, the credential
secret and the database secret. The latter is subsequently
used to open the encrypted database which contains the
customer’s local profile. Specific details of this component
can be found in [24].
Assuming the device is not rooted, the sandboxes of
Windows Phone, iOS and Android provide relatively similar
protection against malware. The situation is different with
physical attacks [25]. We assume that the customer has not
weakened the device security, i.e., a screen lock is config-
ured, ADB is disabled and the device is not rooted. Contrary
to Windows Phone 8+ and iOS 4+, file system encryption in
Android is neither hardware-backed nor enabled by default3.
Following the physical attack model, the remaining feasible
approach is executing dictionary and brute-force attacks on
the encryption passcode [26]. Hardware-backed encryption
forces these attacks to take place on the device, making them
prohibitively slow. If hardware backing is not present, as is
the case on most Android devices, the adversary can leverage
offline computing power.
To address this issue, we introduce a secure storage
component that relies on the properties of a tamper-resistant
secure element, in our case a G&D Mobile Security Card
1.0 [21]. An enrolled app can use its SE to execute trust-
sensitive operations (e.g. voucher redemptions) or to access
keys in its credential store, which are required for authen-
tication or encryption. The secure element enforces app-
specific access through a secret that it shares with the app,
3Only hardware-backed KeyChain storage is provided on supporting
devices that run version 4.3 or higher.
due to prior enrollment. Before an app is allowed access to
its credential store, the secure element asks for the user’s
consent by prompting for his passcode. An attempt limit
prevents brute-force and dictionary attacks.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have implemented the inShopnito system as an An-
droid application and a Java-based server. The tests were
performed on a Samsung Galaxy S3 using Android 4.1.2,
while the server is an Ubuntu machine with an Intel Core
i7 running at 3.4GHz. Finally, the SE is a G&D Mobile
Security Card 1.0 [21].
During application start-up, inShopnito sets up a secure
channel to the SE in order to decrypt the inShopnito cre-
dential, the credential’s secret and the database secret. 15
samples of the application start-up were taken. On average,
7.3 seconds are required to start the app, of which 3.5
seconds are taken up by setting up the secure channel
with the SE and performing the decryption operations. The
remainder is consumed by opening the encrypted database.
Note that accessing the SE for decryption and opening the
encrypted database are operations that are only performed
during application start-up. Hence, we consider this result
practical for people to use.
In order to measure the anonymous authentication and
session establishment, we have assumed a worst-case sce-
nario were the user has chosen to hide as many attributes
in her credential as possible, while still disclosing part of
her preference profile. The average for 100 samples is 1.47
seconds using 2048-bit Idemix keylength and a 5-attribute
Idemix credential.
To obtain vouchers, the SE creates a partially blinded sig-
nature with the voucher issuer. This SE needs 2.73 seconds
to perform all cryptographic operations for a keylength of
1024-bit. In addition, it needs 1.54 seconds to verify the
integrity of the voucher. Redeeming vouchers only requires
a secure connection to be set up between the SEs, which
requires under half a second to finish.
We measured the time it takes to earn and redeem sets
of loyalty points (see Table I). Note that we do not take the
actual value of the points into account, but the total quantity
of tokens. The time it takes to earn points is linear to the
number of points that is being issued, as one partially blinded
signature has to be created for each point. However, the
redemption of points is almost independent of the number
of loyalty points being redeemed. This is because inShopnito
uses only one zero-knowledge proof to assert that all points
are linked to the customer’s credential, rather than having
one proof per point.
Using these results, we can give a conservative estimation
of the total checkout time. Assume that a customer redeems
one voucher and five separate loyalty points, while in return
she earns ten separate loyalty points. This adds up to a total
Table I
TOTAL EARNING AND REDEEMING TIMES OF BATCHES OF 1, 2, 5 AND
10 LOYALTY POINTS. THE TIMES INCLUDE COMPUTATIONS PERFORMED
ON CLIENT AND SERVER AS WELL AS THE NETWORK TIME. THE MEAN
TIMES FOR 100 SAMPLES ARE LISTED IN MILLISECONDS.
Number of Points 1 2 5 10
Earning (ms) 437 640 1282 2421
Redeeming (ms) 742 754 779 807
time of 3.7 seconds , which illustrates that inShopnito is
indeed practical to use.
VI. DISCUSSION
inShopnito’s loyalty points and vouchers rely on sig-
natures to prevent their forgery: only those with a valid
signature are accepted by retailers. In addition, it ensures
that only the retailer or issuer can create new, valid vouchers
and loyalty points, as only they have access to the private
signature key. Furthermore, these digital signatures ensure
that altering parts of a voucher or loyalty point is detectable.
inShopnito denies illegitimate sharing of loyalty points be-
tween customers by linking them to a personal inShopnito
credential. In order to redeem loyalty points, the customer
is required to prove this link using a zero-knowledge proof.
Double-spending of loyalty points is prevented by keeping
a database containing all spent ones. The retailer records
each successfully verified loyalty point. Fortunatly, when
the loyalty points contain an expiration date, the retailer can
regularly expunge expired points from the database.
Contrary to loyalty points, it can be desirable to hand
over vouchers to another person. The voucher’s properties
determine whether or not it is transferable (cfr. section IV-C).
Double voucher spending is prevented through the use of the
trusted execution environment and the fact that no voucher
will ever leave this environment unprotected. Every time
a voucher leaves the SE (for example, when in transit to
another SE), the communication link is secured end-to-
end, with the end-points being the two communicating SEs.
Finally, the issuer keeps a record of vouchers that have
been returned. A denial of service attack on inShopnito is
possible by executing a large number of authentication re-
quests and session initiations. inShopnito requires customers
to first perform an anonymous authentication by proving
ownership of their Idemix credential. However, denial of
service can be limited by using domain pseudonyms. Every
owner of an Idemix credential can generate exactly one valid
domain pseudonym per given domain. Hence, retailers can
choose a time-frame as domain and enforce the usage of
domain pseudonyms by altering the authentication policy.
The same domain pseudonym is generated the second time
someone tries to authenticate in a given time-frame, which
is detectable.
The unlikability of voucher and loyalty point transactions
is protected through the use of a partially blinded signature.
This enables the issuer to verify what it is signing, while
it also prevents the issuer from linking issued vouchers and
points to redeemed ones at a later stage. Furthermore, in-
Shopnito uses the Idemix credential system to safeguard the
customer’s anonymity during authentication. This prevents
the retailer from linking multiple sessions from the same
customer together and thus from building detailed profiles.
However, customers have the option to reveal additional
data, like credential attributes or data derived from their
preference profile. However, if the customer consents to
release additional shopping data, an extra measure is taken to
protect her privacy. Instead of releasing the precise shopping
history down to each individual product, the inShopnito
application discloses only what types of products the cus-
tomer is interested in. The metadata of products that have
been purchased in the past is used to construct a preference
profile which is then disclosed to the retailer. In addition,
customers are able to modify their shopping history and
preference profile (e.g., remove a transaction containing a
privacy-sensitive product).
A retailer could modify inShopnito’s authentication policy
so authenticating customers are required to reveal identifi-
able information to authenticate. That is why transparency
is a key aspect of the inShopnito application. inShopnito
provides a user interface through which the customer can
see her shopping history, preference profile and the authen-
tication policy. This way, the customer gains insight into
what data has been collected so far, and can take a more
informed decision about whether or not to disclose extra
information.
The inShopnito application prevents external adversaries
monitoring communication channels from learning anything,
as all channels are encrypted using SSL/TLS. In addition,
man-in-the-middle attacks are prevented, as inShopnito ex-
plicitly verifies the certificates used to set up these connec-
tions.
inShopnito uses a secure storage component to protect
customers against an external adversary who got hold of
their smartphone and wants to get access to the vouchers,
loyalty points or transactional data. The cryptographic keys
used to decrypt the inShopnito credential and the database
password are kept in a SE and can only be accessed if
the correct passcode is entered. Regarding security, the gap
with iOS and Windows Phone is bridged. Not only are
offline passcode attacks prevented, the secure element is also
blocked as soon as the passcode entry limit is exhausted.
This makes data on the device unavailable, in a similar
manner as an iOS or Windows Phone wipe. Because of the
limited number of attempts, the passcode may be short and
non-complex, keeping the usability burden small.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented inShopnito, a mobile shopping
assistant that offers a rich set of features without sacrificing
the privacy of the user. We accomplished this by integrating
multiple advanced components into a single cohesive, us-
able application. Our privacy-friendly approach to authen-
tication, data storage, loyalty programs, discount vouchers
and personalized recommendations provides benefits and
protection to both customers and retailers. The proposed
solution includes protective measures against forgery and
privacy threats originating from malicious customers, overly
curious retailers and external adversaries. Our performance
evaluation showed that under worst-case circumstances the
application still performs adequately.
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